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FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF
THE FAMILY*
FRANCES M. RYAN**
E. TRUSTS

In the golden era of trusts prior to the Clifford case, the legal ingenuity of the grantor's attorney was curbed by comparatively few income-tax statutes. Sections 162 and 163 determined what income was
taxable and whether the tax should be paid by the trustee or by the
beneficiary. Sections 166 and 167 related the exceptional cases in which
the grantor of the trust was to be liable for the income tax. Section
166 provided (and still does) that:
"Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title
to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested(1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any
person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, or
(2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in
the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom,
then the income of such part of the trust shall be included in
computing the net income of the grantor."
Similar provisions had been included in previous revenue acts, although
prior to 1932 the grantor was held taxable on income under the section
only if he held the power to revest either alone or in conjunction
with a person not a beneficiary of the trust.6 9 The change was made
to prevent the grantor's keeping this power in substance by sharing it
with one receiving a very minute benefit or none at all from the trust.
It was felt that such a person would have little or no interest in keeping
the trust alive and would be amenable to any suggestions made by the
trustor. 90
*This paper was submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M degree at the Law School of, the University of Michigan.
It is being published as two articles, of which this is the second. The first
appeared in the February issue of the Review.
**LL.B, Marquette Law School; LL.M., University of Michigan Law School;
member of the Wisconsin Bar.
89A comparable section first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 219(g),
43 Stat. 253, Public No. 176, 68 Congress, 1st Session.

90 Report of Senate Finance Committee, No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Session, at p. 34.
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Section 167 provides that a grantor shall be taxed on any part of
the income of a trust if it:
"(1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person
not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of
such part of the income may be, held or accumulated for future
distribution to the grantor; or
"(2) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person
not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of
such part of the income may be, applied to the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor."
The history of this section is similar to that of Section 166. Prior
to 1932 the section applied only if the discretion to use income in the
manner indicated was lodged in the grantor alone or in conjunction
with a person not a beneficiary of the trust,91 which gave the trustor
the same opportunities to control income that he then had to retain
an untaxed control of the corpus. The statute was amended by the
addition of subsection (c) in 1944 to provide that the grantor should
be taxable only on that portion of the income which was actually applied to the support and maintenance of one toward whom he had such
a legal obligation, 92 and not on any income that might be so applied,
9
as was previously held.

3

The metamorphosis caused by Helvering v. Clifford,94 decided by
the Supreme Court in 1940, was both complete and abrupt. In 1934
Clifford created a trust of certain securities which he then owned, making himself trustee. The trust was to run for a maximum period of
five years, but might terminate sooner upon the death of either the
grantor or his wife. During the term of the trust the grantor-trustee
was to pay "in his absolute discretion" part or all of the income to
his wife. Upon termination the corpus was to revert to the grantor
and all accumulated income and the proceeds therefrom were to be paid
to the wife. The grantor retained power to vote the stock put into the
trust fund, to mortgage, sell, or pledge the shares, and to deal with
the trust funds as he in his discretion saw fit. The instrument also
provided that he should be responsible for no losses other than those
caused by his "own wilful and deliberate breach of duties as trustee"
and forbade the wife to anticipate her interest in any way. The trust
agreement explicitly stated that the arrangement was not meant to
relieve the grantor of his legal duties in support of his wife or family
and that no restrictions were placed on the wife's use of the income
received by her. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the commissioner
9

'Supra, note 89, Sec. 219(h).

92 Revenue Act of 1944, Sec. 134, 58 Stat. 21, Public No. 235, 78th Congress,

2nd Session.
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 63 S.Ct. 140 (1942).
94309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
93
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in his decision that the husband, rather than the wife, was taxable upon
the 1934 trust income. This decision was reversed in the circuit court
and the government carried the case to the Supreme Court.
After reviewing the facts of the case, Justice Douglas quoted Section 22(a) 95 and stated that, "The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full measure of its taxing
power within those definable categories. ' 96 He then declared that it
was the duty of the court not to let "technical considerations" obscure
the basic issue; whether the grantor of a trust could still be treated as
owner of the corpus, and observed that the answer to this question lay
in an analysis of the circumstances of each particular case.
Perhaps nothing contained in judicial tax decisions is more frequently quoted than the list of factors upon which the court relied to
find that Clifford was to be treated as owner of the corpus for incometax purposes. These were: (1) the short duration of the trust, (2)
the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and (3) the retention of
control over the corpus by the grantor. In arguing that these conditions equated to ownership, the justice stated:
"So far as his dominion and control were concerned it seems
clear that the trust did not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over the corpus was in all essential respects the
same after the trust was created, as before. The wide powers
which he retained included for all practical purposes most of
the control which he as an individual would have. There were,
we may assume, exceptions, such as his disability to make a gift
of the corpus to others during the term of the trust and to make
loans to himself. But this dilution in his control would seem to
be insignificant and immaterial, since control over investment
remained. If it be said that such control is the type of dominion exercised by any trustee, the answer is simple. We have at
best a temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group. Since the income remains in the family and since the
husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial
change in his economic position. It is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had been executed, or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in fact.
For as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the
familial relationship respondent retained the substance of full
enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the prop95Sec. 22(a) reads as follows: "'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and
income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service

of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions,

vocations, trades, businesses, commerce or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest
in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
9 income derived from any source whatever...
6Supra, note 94, at 334.
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erty. That might not be true if only strictly legal rights were
considered. But when the benefits flowing to him indirectly
through the wife are added to the legal rights he retained, the
aggregate may be said to be a fair equivalent of what he previously had. To exclude from the aggregate those indirect benefits
would be to deprive Section 22(a) of considerable vitality and
to treat as immaterial what may be highly relevant considerations
in the creation of such family trusts. For where the head of a
household has income in excess of normal needs, it may well
make but little difference to him (except income-tax-wise) where
portions of that income are routed-so long as it stays in the
family group. In those circumstances the all-important factor
might be retention by him of control over the principal. With
the control in his hands he would keep direct command over all
that he needed to remain in substantially the same financial situation as before. Our point here is that no one fact is normally
decisive but that all considerations and circumstances of the kind
we have mentioned are relevant to the question of ownership and
are appropriate foundations for findings on that issue. Thus,
where, as in this case, the benefits directly or indirectly retained
blend §o imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership, we cannot say that the triers of fact committed reversible
error when they found that the husband was the owner of the
corpus for the purposes of Section 22(a). To hold otherwise
would be to treat the wife as a complete stranger; to let mere
formalism obscure the normal consequences of family solidarity;
and to force concepts of ownership to be fashioned out of legal
niceties which may have
little or no significance in such house97
hold arrangements."
In the remainder of the opinion the relationship of Sections 166
and 167 to 22(a) is discussed, and it is stated that the former merely
carve out of the area of taxable income a small group of cases in which
the grantor is to be taxed; but that the sections are not exclusive and
whenever it is found that the gain from a trust is really income to the
grantor, as it is defined in Section 22(a), he may be taxed thereon
whether or not the other sections are applicable. That Congress had
not seen fit to lay down a "rule of thumb" for trust situations other
than those covered by Supplement E of the Code only indicated, in
the view of the Court, that it meant to "leave to the triers of fact the
initial determination of whether or not on the facts of each case the
grantor remains the owner for purposes of Section 22(a)."9 8
The usual flow of regulatory interpretations did not follow the
Clifford case and from 1940 to 1946 the courts struggled, and sometimes not without complaints, to determine when "temporary reallocations" and "indirect benefits" spelled out taxability for the grantor.
They could garner little aid from the statement in the decision that
97 Supra, note 94, at 335ff.

98 Supra, note 94, at 338.
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"no one fact is normally decisive," but is merely "relevant to the question of ownership." 9
This sentence was probably the one most responsible for the use
of the decision as a "tax-the-grantor" precedent in a wide variety of
situations. Since no one factor was controlling, it was not necessary
that all three be present; at least, to the degree shown in the Clifford
trust. The circuit courts varied in their applications of the doctrine.
For example, in the second circuit the idea has been expressed that
shortness of term alone may be sufficiently indicative of control. 100 On
the other hand, it has refused to tax the grantor who retains power to
vote stock of a trust, when such stock represents a controlling interest
in his business.10 ' During this six years the value of the short-term
trust as a family security measure was considerably lessened.
Although one view was that the concept's greatest strength lay in
the vagueness which gave it its elasticity,1 2 the treasury eventually
noted that "in the absence of precise guides supplied by an appropriate
regulation, the application of this principle to varying and diversified
03
factual situations has led to considerable uncertainty and confusion"'
and set about to remedy the situation by the publication of the Clifford
regulations late in 1945104 and by amendments thereto in 1947.105 The
regulations provide that the income of a trust is to be taxed to the
grantor if:
"(1) the corpus or the income therefrom will or may return
after a relatively short term of years;
"(2) the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income
therefrom is subject to a power of disposition . . . whether by
revocation, alteration or otherwise, exercisable by the grantor,
or another person lacking a substantial adverse interest in such
disposition; or both;
"(3) the corpus or the income therefrom is subject to administrative control, exercisable primarily for the benefit of the
grantor."'0 1
Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)' 0 7 further explain these conditions.
In paragraph (c) a "short term" is defined as a period of ten years or
99 Supra, note 94, at 336.
100 Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C.C.A 2d, 1941); Helvering v. Elias,
122 F.(2d) 171 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941), cert. den., 314 U.S. 692, 62 S.Ct. 361 (1941).

Naylor, "Federal Tax Effects of Powers of Management and Control over
Trust Investments," 41 Ill.
L. Rev. 508 (Nov.-Dec., 1946). See cases cited
at note 44.
102 Pavensteat is often quoted as proponent of this view, expressed in "The
Broadened Scope of Section 22(a) : The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine,"
51 Yale L. J. 213 (Dec., 1941).
101

103Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-21(a).
104 T.D. 5488, Dec. 29, 1945.
105 T.D. 5567, June 30, 1947.
106 Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)-21 (b).
107

Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22(a)- 2 1.
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less. However, if the grantor, his spouse (living with him and not
having a substantial adverse interest), or both of them retain administrative controls, the period is extended to fifteen years. Subparagraph
(d.) sets forth certain exceptions to subsection (b) (2). It states, among
other things, that the tax will not fall upon the grantor if a trustee or
trustees other than the grantor, a spouse living with him, a parent,
relative or issue has the power, not subject to approval of any other
person, to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income to or for beneficiaries, or to pay out corpus to them. If any of the excepted persons
are given discretionary powers which may be used to affect the interests of beneficiaries which include the spouse or children of the
grantor, further conditions are provided. If such person has a discretionary power to pay out corpus, it must either be limited by a definite external standard or payments must be charged against the proportionate share of the trust from which the income payable to such
beneficiary arises. The power as trustee of a person in the family group
to accumulate income can be exercised so as to save the grantor from
the tax thereon only if it is ultimately paid to the beneficiary, his estate,
or appointees. Further provisions, not pertinent to this discussion, are
included.
Prohibited administrative controls are listed in subparagraph (e)
and include powers exercisable by the grantor, or one not having a
substantial adverse interest, or both to purchase, exchange, or dispose
of corpus or income for less than an adequate consideration, to borrow
from the trust without provisions for adequate interest and security,
or to vote the stock, or control investments.
The regulations have made any one of the listed factors sufficient
to establish the grantor's income-tax liability, and in this regard they
go far beyond the Clifford case, in which a combination of circumstances was stressed. Over the years since the case was decided, the
tendency has been to rely less upon the family factor than upon shortness of term and retained controls of one type or another. The regulations do not even mention the family relationship as one of the basic
factors upon which tax liability of the grantor depends, although Section 29.22(a) -21 (f) does contain the saving statement that, "The grantor may also be taxable on the income of a trust on the ground that
such income is attributable to him in a capacity unrelated to dominion
and control over the trust as such are defined in subsections (c), (d)
and (e) of this section." Since most of the cases which might be affected by the regulations would, in the nature of things, involve family
trusts, it was probably thought best not to list this factor and thus
bluntly present the question whether the mere fact that a trust is to
operate for the benefit of the grantor's family forestalls any income-tax
shifting.

19491
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Although the regulations do in certain cases specifically deny any
tax saving to a donor who makes a family member a trustee, probably
their general effect upon the family trust is not great. The trial court
is told, as before, that all circumstances of the arrangement are relevant to its decision and will, in all probability, continue to maintain,
in general, the attitude of the Eighth Circuit that:
"The decisions, of course, do not purport to hold that family
relationship as such or.alone can afford a sufficient basis for taxing the income of a trust to the donee, where he has retained
no substantial elements or incidents of control over the property
or its income. But where there is a retention of substantial control over the trust property or its income, the degree of family
relationship involved, even without legal obligation of support,
may well serve to intensify the economic focus of, and to bring
into practical relief, the nature, purpose and effect of his control,
in relation to his previous economic ownership and enjoyment
... We think the family relationship may properly constitute a
material factor in the fact-trier's evaluation of whether the nature, purpose and effect of the donor's control of corpus and
power to command income may fairly represent to him in the
particular situation on the economic equivalent of his previous
ownership and enjoyment."'10
Such a statement represents, of course, the more conservative view
and rests upon the. solid basis of the Supreme Court decision. One
cannot help but notice again, however, that this whole area has been
completely conquered by the "economic enjoyment" theory, a mercenary imported from the field of political economy and bringing with it
the usual dangers of uncontrolled use in a strange environment.
One of the most frequent criticisms leveled at the present system
is that of its lack of correlation of income, gift and estate-tax philosophy-particularly in' the trust field. Under strict property law,
ownership of the trust corpus passes from the grantor to another, but
in order to defeat the use of this concept to achieve tax savings, several
more informal ideas of ownership have been developed and woven
into estate-tax statutes. The gross estate is defined in Section 811 of
the Code. After subjecting the probate estate of the decedent to the
tax, it lists various other property interests which are to be considered
a part of his estate for purposes of taxation. Among them are transfers in contemplation of death, transfers taking effect at death, revocable transfers, and property subject to a power of appointment;
any of which might have trust property as its subject matter.
Section 811(c) relates to transfers in contemplation of death,
whether made by a gift outright or in trust. Of course, the statute
10s

Edison v. Commissioner, 148 F.(2d) 810, 814, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945), cert. den.,
326 U.S. 721, 66 S.Ct. 25 (1945).
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applies in any case in which a disposition in contemplation of death
has been made, regardless of whether the donee is a member of the
grantor's immediate family. However, the relationship might serve
as evidentiary matter pointing toward the existence of such a motive
in the making of the gift, and, in the nature of things, the statute is
probably applied more often to gifts within the family circle than
without it. Since the greater proportion of propertied persons desire
to pass their holdings to the surviving members of their families, it
is only natural that most inter vivos gifts, whether designed to avoid
estate taxes or not, should be made to that class of recipients.
Section 811(c) also deals with gifts intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death and provides that they shall be
included in the gross estate:
"To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise ....

in-

tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust
or otherwise, under which he has retained for hiA life or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with
any person to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth."
The federal estate-tax laws have contained a provision relating to
"transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death" since 1916. The latter part of the section, specifically levying
a tax in cases in which the grantor retains a life interest in the transferred property, was added in 1931 after the Supreme Court decision
of May v. Heiner,0 9 wherein it was held that the mere reservation of
a life estate by the grantor, without more, did not make the transferred
portion taxable under the unamended provision.
With regard to the right of the grantor to change the beneficial
ownership or enjoyment of corpus or income, the estate-tax law differs
from the income-tax statutes. Under the latter the grantor is taxed
on the income of a trust only if the power is held by him alone, by
a person lacking a substantial adverse interest, or both. n ° Section
811(c) of the estate-tax law, however, provides that if such a power
is reserved by the grantor "either alone or in conjunction with any person," the corpus will be held a part of his taxable estate. Therefore,
he can avoid the estate tax only by giving the power to someone else
and stepping out of the picture entirely. This, however, 'Might not be
109 281 U.S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1930).
110 Supra, note 105.
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sufficient to enable him to shift the income tax; to do that, he would
have to vest the power of disposition in someone with a "substantial
adverse interest," although he might share the power with him, so far
as the income tax is concerned. Probably the estate-tax requirements
are more favorable to the taxpayer, since he still has the privilege of
placing the power in one who will be apt to do his bidding, even though
he cannot actually retain it himself.
In 1940 the case of Helvering v. Hallock111 was decided, interpreting Section 811(c) broadly to include in the gross estate of the decedent the full value of any property in which he retained a contingent
reversionary interest; a "string" which would be cut only by his death.
In so deciding, the Court overruled it previous decision of Helvering
v. St. Louis Trust Company,1 1 2 wherein it had held that a possibility
of reverter was not a property interest such as could pass to another
at the death of the decedent and enlarge or ripen the interest of any
grantee; but that death "simply put an end to what, at best, was a mere
possibility of reverter by extinguishing it-that is to say, by converting
' 3
what was merely possible into an utter impossibility.
It soon became evident that the way had been opened to levy an
estate tax on the basis of Section 811(c) upon every piece of property
transferred subject to such a possibility of reverter, however valueless it might actually be. M4 However, the trend in this direction was
halted by the promulgation of T.D. 5512 on May 2, 1946, amending
Section 81.17 of the Estate-Tax Regulations. The new regulation
brings into the foreground a requirement implicit in almost every one
of the previously decided "possibility of reverter" cases.115 It requires,
first, in order to sustain a tax upon the estate of the deceased, that
"possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained
only by beneficiaries who must survive the decedent" and, second, that
"the decedent or his estate" possess some "right or interest in the property (whether arising by the express terms of the instrument of transn6
fer or otherwise.)"
To some critics the new regulation appears as a vast improvement,
changing the Hallock decision "from a problem to a rule; '"17 while
to others it is an unwarranted piece of treasury legislation and of doubt309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
296 U.S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74 (1935).
3 Ibid., at 43.
114 Commissioner v. Field, 324 U.S. 113, 65 S. Ct. 511 (1945); Fidelity-Phila111
112

11

delphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S. Ct. 508 (1945).

115 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1946 Supplement), p. 198;

Platt,
"The New Hallock Regulation," 2 Tax L. Rev. 94, 95 (Oct.-Nov., 1946).
316 Treas. Reg. 105, Sec. 81.17.
117 Platt, supra, note 115, at 102. The regulation is also discussed with approval
by Brown in "The New 'Hallock' Regulations," 83 Trusts and Estates 227
(Sept., 1946).
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ful validity.""' In any event, the new regulation should be easier on
the taxpayer's pocketbook than the position formerly taken by the
treasury that any reverter or retained interest made the estate tax
inevitable.
Although not confined in its applications either to the family-transfer arena or to the field of devolutions in trust, Section 811 (c) is often
called into use against a transfer in trust for the benefit of family members. Again, this is only to be expected, as estate-tax law, though general in its wording, will be applied much more often than not to the intrafamily transfers which most persons make at death or to the attempted
testamentary dispositions made in lieu thereof earlier in life. The evident purpose of this section is, of course, to prevent tax avoidance by
the use of inter vivos transfers, and one author has gone so far as
to predict that it will eventually supplant the "contemplation of death"
provision and that evidence of a tax-avoidance motive will be sufficient
in itself to bring about a tax on the property conveyed." 9 This, however, seems unlikely in view of the limitations of the new "Hallock"
regulation.
Section 811(d) (1) of the Code provides that the estate of the decedent will be taxed:
"To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other
person (without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,
or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death."
This section was first added to the estate-tax law by the 1924 Revenue
Act. It has been subdivided and reworded by later amendments. 2"
However, it has been decided that, even aside from the statute and
as to trusts created before its passage, retention by the grantor of an
outright power of revocation or termination subjects the property
transferred to an estate tax at his death ;121 this being held on the
ground that there has been no completed transfer.
I's Montgomery in his 1947-1948 edition of Federal Taxes-Estates, Trusts and
Gifts refers to the section as "legalistic and lacking in substance," (p. 475).
He suggests the abolition of the phrase "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death" from the Code and the taxing of the actual
value of the retained interest under 811(a).
119 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1942), Sec. 7.05.
120 The first such statute was contained in the Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 301(d),
43 Stat. 253, Public No. 176, 68th Congress, 1st Session. See Paul, ibid,
Sec. 7.06, for a detailed history of the section. Exhibit "B," facing page 395,
shows clearly the various changes in the wording of the act which were made
by amendments to it.
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Cases arising under this section bear quite a resemblance to those
to which the Clifford doctrine would be applicable in the income-tax
field, and the problem is generally one of determining whether the
various retained controls add up to a power of alteration or revocation; i.e., dominion and control over the property. However, the economic concept of the ownership in terms of command and enjoyment
has not been carried so far in the field of estate taxes as it has with
regard to the income tax, although a slow invasion is noticeable.1 22 The
section's general effect upon family trusts is much the same as that of
the Clifford rule. It serves to impede the making of anything less than
an absolute gift of property, whether in trust or otherwise. However,
the donor may still avoid estate taxes by placing powers of alteration
or revocation it qomeone other than himself.' 23 Such person need not
have a substantial adverse interest, as would be necessary if any in124
come-tax shiftilig were to be achieved.
Property su',-ect to a power of appointment was first taxed under
the 1918 Reven ke Act. The act applied only to property "passing under a general po Jer of appointment exercised by the decedent"'2 5 under
certain circumstances. Problems constantly arose over what was meant
by a "general power" and by its exercise. In 1942, therefore, the section was completely revised to levy a tax upon the estate of the donee
of the power:
"To the extent of any property (A) with respect to which
the decedent has at the time of his death a power of appointment, or (B) with respect to which he has at any time exercised
or released a power of appointment in contemplation of death,
or (C) with respect to which he has at any time exercised or
released a power of appointment by a disposition intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, or
by a disposition under which he has retained for his life or any
period not ascertainable without reference to his death (i) the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with
any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona
fide sale for an 26adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth."'
1

21

Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct 123 (1929).

122 Supra, note 119, at page 310.

attempt was made in 1936 to make the property taxable as a part of the
decedent's estate in cases in which a power of alteration, amendment, or
revocation was given to any other person. See H.R. Rep., No. 2818, 74th
Congress, 2nd Session, p. 9-10.
124Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 2922(a)-21(b)(2). I.R.C., Sec. 166, would apply to
cases in which the power was one to revest title to any part of the corpus
inthe grantor.
125 Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 402(e), 40 Stat. 1057, Public No. 254, 65th Congress, 3rd Session.
123An

1261.R.C.,

Sec. 811(f) (1).
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Subsection (2) defines a power broadly to include "any power
to appoint exercisable by the decedent either alone or in conjunction
with any person." It then excepts from tax property subject to a
power to appoint to certain types of charities or to a defined familial
group, including none other than the spouse of the decedent or his
spouse, descendants of the creator of the power (other than decedent)
or his spouse, and spouses of such descendants. This section represents
a definite effort on the part of Congress to preserve free from tax a
valuable and flexible estate-planning device, as long as it is used in aid
of the immediate family.
Prompted by similar motives, it also made an exception of a power
held only in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of a restricted group
not including the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or those of
his estate. 27 By meeting the terms of this section, the donor may create
a power of appointment exercisable for the benefit of persons other
than those listed in subsection (2) (a)-for example, his collateral relatives-without subjecting the donee to an estate tax at the latter's death.
If, in either case, however, the power is exercised by the creation of
a second power, the exception does not apply and the estate of the
donee of the first power becomes taxable upon the property to the
extent that it was made subject by him to a second power.Y
Although open to minor criticisms, 12 9 the section is one of the more
effective legislative attempts to curtail tax avoidance and at the same
time one that shows ample consideration for the problems of a familyhead who must map out such a financial course as to avoid an unplanned future for his family, on the one hand, and property-passing
devices frowned upon by the Treasury Department, on the other.
Little help can be gained from the Code in determining when the
donor of trust property becomes liable to a gift tax. The tax is imposed
by Section 1000, regardless of "whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible.""20
If a transfer in trust is determined to have been made in contemplation of death and an estate tax is levied upon the transferred property for this reason, a credit is provided for any gift tax which may
have been previously paid."' l The earlier imposition of the gift tax
would have been dependant, however, on other characteristics of the
trust.
1271I.R.C., Sec. 811(f) (2) (B).
128 I.R.C., Sec. 811(f) (2).
129 For an evaluation of the section in its present form, see: Paul, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation (1946 Supplement), Sec. 9.30-9.34; Montgomery,
Federal Taxes-Estates, Trusts and Gifts (1947-1948 edition), p. 526.
0

13 I.R.C., Sec. 1000(b).
131

I.R.C., Sec. 813.

1949]

TAX TREATMENT

If a trust is intended "to take effect in possession or enjoyment" at
or after the grantor's death in the sense that he has the power to change
beneficiaries or alter their interests up to that time, the gift is not
complete while such power is retained.132 The same is true of a retained power to revoke the trust.-3 3

The regulations state, however,

that, "A gift shall not be considered incomplete... merely because the
donor reserves the power to change the manner or time of enjoyment
thereof,"'-34 and, in illustration, it is stated that a retained power in
the donor to accumulate income for the benefit of the donee, if he so
desires, and to pay it to him with the corpus at the end of the trust
term will not stay the imposition of the gift tax. The regulations also
state that the donor will be considered as having the power of disposition over the property if it is exercisable by him in conjunction with
someone not having a substantial adverse interest therein3,'5
There is a completed transfer, taxable at its full value less the
present worth of the donor's retained rights figured on an actuarial
basis, if a possibility of reverter existsa38 or if the grantor retains economic benefits in the trust-such as a right to a part or all of the
income for life- -13 7 but vests the remaining interests in others. If he
sets up a trust for the support of his wife or the discharge of other
family obligations during his life, however, there should be no gift
tax, as the trust is being used only to carry out the duties for which he
is legally responsible.' ss
The general theory underlying the gift tax is that it should be imposed whenever there has been a completed transfer whereby the donor
has parted with all dominion and control over the subject matter of
the gift. 9 Such a philosophy is better fitted for correlation with estatetax than with income-tax statutes, and earlier cases indicated that the
two were meant to supplement each other. 40 Later, however, an atSanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, S. Ct. 51 (1939); Treas. Reg. 108,
Sec. 86.3.
133 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 53 S.Ct. 369 (1933); Treas. Reg. 108,
Sec. 86.3.
134 Treas. Reg. 108, Sec. 86.3.
135 Ibid.
136 Treas. Reg. 108, Sec. 862, Example (7).
137 See Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1942), Sec. 17.12, for a dis-

132

cussion of the difficulties involved in rationalizing the estate and gift-tax
treatment of property transferred in this manner.
138 Rudick, "Marriage, Divorce and Taxes," 2 Tax L. Rev. 123, 135 (Dec., 1946-

Jan., 1947). If the trust is to extend for the life of a wife whose expectancy
is greater than that of her husband, the trust does more than merely discharge
the grantor's support obligation, which ceases at his death, and to the extent
that it is so used, a taxable gift has been made. See, also, chart on pages
136-137 for a more detailed presentation of the income, estate, and gift-tax
incidence as the terms of the support trust are varied.

139 I.R.C., Sec. 1000.

140 Ibid. This section also provides under certain circumstances for tax-free re-

leases of powers created prior to January 1, 1939.
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tempt was made to use the gift tax as a retriever of revenue lost
through the reduction of surtaxes by means of transfers of incomeproducing property. Confusion has resulted from the casting of the
gift tax in this double role, and the consequent uncertainty of the tax
incidence of some types of transfers, together with the possibility of
heavy multiple taxes, has made family transfers in trust of more dubious value . 41'
That the trust device has managed, however, to retain its usefulness in spite of treasury onslaughts from all three sides is evident from
the number of trust cases which still come before the courts. Certainly,
its inherent value as a transfer medium is not to be denied, and little
could be said in favor of a system of taxation which would make it
too expensive from the tax viewpoint to resort to the trust when called
for by wise estate-planning. So far the present tax structure has not
gone. Although the head of a family must be scrupulously careful
about divesting himself of all indicia of ownership when making a
trust settlement, if he is prompted by a genuine desire to provide for
his family rather than merely to save taxes for himself or his estate,
he need not pay too high a price for his transfer.
F. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
It is probably because they never were solved that the tax problems raised by the diversities of the community-property and the common-law property systems continue to be of interest. One defeat after
another met the ingenious tax-dodger who held his property according
to English tradition, but they only served to highlight the favorable
position of the residents of states which clung to a jurisprudence of
Spanish origin, until the less conservative common-law states became
willing to abandon their legal inheritance in favor of the tax savings
1 2
to be obtained by the adoption of the community-property system. 1
The question of income-tax treatment of holders of property in
community was first ruled upon by Attorney General Palmer in 1920
and 1921,'14 when he held that spouses in all community-property jurisdictions, except California,"4 4 could pay their taxes separately, each
If the husband, for example, sets up a trust, retaining the power as grantor,
to apply the income for the support of his wife or to accumulate it for an
adult son who is to receive both the corpus and accumulations on the
termination of the trust, he is taxable on the trust income, must pay a gift
tax on the value of the remainder and on any accumulations as made, and,
in addition, the corpus will be included in his gross estate.
142 See note 4, supra, for a list of the community-property states.
14332 Op. Atty Gen. 298 (1920) ; 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921).
144 California residents were denied the income-splitting advantage because the
wife's interest there was only an expectancy and not a vested right under
local law. This view was upheld in United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315,
46 S. Ct. 148 (1926). Thereafter, the California law was amended to correct the former defect.
141
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reporting one-half of the community income. This holding received
the approval of the Supreme Court in the decision of Poe v.Seaborn 45
and its companion cases. 46
In the Seaborn case the husband, a resident with his wife of the
state of Washington, had recovered in district court an additional income tax paid by him under protest on the income from the community
estate which, according t? local law, was owned by his wife. The Supreme Court upheld the decision on the ground that "the wife has, in
Washington, a vested property right in community property, equal
with that of her husband; and in the income of the community, including salaries or wages of either husband or wife, or both."'1 7 The Court
reviewed the powers of the wife arising from this "vested property
right" and found them to be so substantial as to preclude any use of
the "dominion and control" theory of taxation.
Throughout the years which followed, Poe v. Seaborn, decided on
technical property concepts, stood more and more alone, as other cases
in the income-tax field were judged less often by reference to local
property law than to the "actualities" and "realities" of their situations.
However, community income continued to be divisible, and the tax
savings of wealthier community-property state residents were substantial.'"

In 1939 Oklahoma attempted to obtain the tax benefits of the system by allowing her married couples to elect to hold property in com14 9
munity. The plan failed of its purpose, however, when the Court held'
that it amounted to no more than an attempted assignment within the
doctrine of Lucas v. Earl.50 Thereafter, states which wished to obtain
the advantages to be gained from the superposition of federal tax law
upon a Spanish property system were forced to adopt the latter wholeheartedly and on a compulsory basis.
For a time community-property state residents were also favored
by the estate and gift-tax laws. Prior to 1942 husband and wife were
each treated as owner of one half the community wherever local law
145 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).

46 Three similar cases were decided at the same time. They were: Goodell v.
Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 51 S. Ct. 62; Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 51 S. Ct.
62; and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64, arising in the states of
Arizona, Texas and Louisiana respectively.
147 Supra, note 145, at 111.
148The combined income-tax bill of spouses domiciled in community-property
states has often been no more than 60% of the total tax paid by a couple
similarly situated, but living in a common-law jurisdiction. On an average,
income taxes have been 30 to 32 per cent lighter in the former group of
states. This, of course, results from the opportunity of the communityproperty state residents to transfer that portion of the husband's income
which would fall in the highest surtax brackets to the lower income-tax
brackets available to the wife who has no separate income of her own.
149 Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
15OSupra, note 33.
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so decreed; and each was taxable upon one half at his death'5 1 or upon
one half the value of a gift made from it.'5 ' In 1942, however, the
Code was amended to provide that the gross estate of the decedent
should include:
". the interest therein held as community property by the
decedent and surviving spouse under the law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States or any foreign country,
except such part thereof as may be shown to have been received
as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the
surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation
or from separate property of the surviving spouse. In no case
shall such interest included in the gross estate of the decedent be
less than the value of such part of the community property as
to the decedent's power of testamentary disposiwas subject
53
tion."1

The constitutionality of this section was upheld in Fernandez v.
Weiner'54 and United States v. Rompel.15 decided in 1945. In the
former case the couple had been domiciled in Louisiana. Upon the
death of the husband an estate tax was imposed upon the value of the
whole community. In upholding the validity of Section 811 (e) (2), the
Court stated:
"... the death of the husband of the Louisiana marital community not only operates to transfer his rights in his share of
the community to his heirs or those taking under his will. It
terminates his expansive and sometimes profitable control over
the wife's share, and for the first time brings her half of the
property into her full and exclusive possession, control and enjoyment. The cessation of these extensive powers of the husband, even though they were powers over property which he
never "owned," and the establishment in the wife of new powers
of control over her share, though it was always hers, furnish
156
appropriate occasions for the imposition of an excise tax.'
Again, vested rights were disregarded and command over the property
was considered to be of paramount importance to the tax issue.
Although Section 811(e) has limited the application of this theory
by excepting from the estate tax property economically attributable
to the survivor, it also provides that the decedent's estate shall in no
case be taxed on less than the value of the property over which he or
151 Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 Fed. 688 (D.C., W.D., Louisiana, 1921); Esperson
v. Commissioner, 49 F.(2d) 259 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931); See also, Paul, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation (1942), Sec. 4.11 and cases cited in note 29 of that
section.
15 Although this is the general rule, there are exceptions to it because of variations in the state community-property systems. See Paul, ibid, Sec. 16.17,
for a discussion of the matter.
15 I.R.C., Sec. 811 (e)(2).
'154326 U.S. 340, 66 S. Ct. 178 (1945).

155 326 U.S. 367, 66 S.Ct. 191 (1945).
25sSupra, note 154, at 355.
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she held a power of testamentary disposition. While consistent with
a "control" concept of taxation, this limitation often brings about a
harsh result when the wife is first to die. Even though the husband
contributed all the assets to the community, one half the value of the
estate is taxable upon the wife's death, and should she leave her portion
of the property to him, one and one-half times the customary amount
of estate tax might very well be paid on the property in the space of
one generation. If the origin of the assets cannot be proved, a serious
situation may arise upon the death of either spouse, as the burden is
upon the estate to prove what portion of the property has been acquired
through the efforts of the survivor, if the tax is to be diminished. 5 7
Although the section has received some approval, censure of it has
been severe; some critics being of the opinion that it is based on a complete misapprehension of the community-property system l5 s and that
the sentence providing for a tax on the testamentary estate in any
event was really the result of a congressional oversight.159
A further disadvantage to the survivor of the community lies in
the fact that his share of the property retains its community cost basis,
even though it has been included in the gross estate of his spouse; and
only the cost basis of the share subject to a power of testamentary
disposition by the decedent is raised to its market value at the date of
his death. 10
The gift-tax law was also changed in 1942 to provide that gifts
made from community property should be considered gifts of the husband, except to the extent that they were shown to be economically
attributable to the wife.' 0 ' As a result, the husband would normally
pay all the tax on a gift, whereas if the same property were retained
in the community, at least one half of it would be considered the wife's
for the purpose of the estate tax at her death.
As to transfers between the parties, the regulations provide that the
same rule which is applicable to gifts made from the community to
third parties shall apply:
"... to a division of such community property between husband and wife into the separate property of each, and to a transfer by the husband and wife of any part of such community
property into the separate property either of the husband or of
157 Treas. Reg. 105, Sec. 81.23.
158 de Funiak, "The United States Supreme Court and the Wiener Case," 23
Notre Dame Lawyer 28 (November, 1947); Hudspeth, "Minimizing Federal
Estate Taxes in Community Property States," 24 Tex. L. Rev. 483 (June,
1946); Nossaman, "Taxation of Community Property," 83 Trusts and Estates
161 (Aug., 1946); Winstead, "Constitutionality of Federal Estate Taxation
of Community Property," 24 Tex. L. Rev. 34 (Dec., 1945).
:159 Irion, "The Surviving Husband and the Wiener Case," 25 Taxes 64 (Nov.,
1947) ; Winstead, supra, note 158.
160 I.R.C., Sec. 113(a) (5).
161 I.R.C., Sec. 1000(d).
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the wife, or into a joint estate or tenancy by the entirety of
both spouses... No gift tax results from a transfer on or after
January 1, 1943, of
separate property of either spouse into com'0 2
munity property."'
Unusual results flokv from the foregoing rule. For example, if a husband makes a gift of community property, none of which is economically attributable to her, to his wife, the entire gift is taxable to him,
even though she already has a vested one-half interest in it. On the
other hand, if the wife should transfer the same property to her husband, there would be no gift tax assessable against her in spite of her
0 3
one-half interest-
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treated in the opinion. In the Clifford,case, the next development, the
Court went a step further and determined that Clifford remained the
owner of the income merely "for the purposes of Section 22(a),"16G
and relied upon that section with even greater firmness than it had
in the assignment case. "Dominion and control" made its appearance in
this opinion, together with its teammate, "special scrutiny." These
same notions were carried forward into the Lusthaus and Tower cases
and used as the basis of a new legal concept; the rule that a pure gift
of a partnership interest from one spouse to another has no significance
from the tax viewpoint.
The Horst case,36 8 although decided before the partnership cases,

represents the culmination of the engrafting of economic upon legal
theory. It was decided, not on a theory of continued dominion and
control equating to ownership, but on the basis of "nonmaterial satisfactions," equivalent to income, which the taxpayer had derived from
the disposal of his right before it had become realized income to him.
Both types of reasoning have been developed in and largely confined
to situations involving family relationships and for the purpose of
preventing intra-family transfers to achieve tax reductions. Although
apt to be offensive to the legalistic mind, they made possible judicial
blocking of income-tax shifting in common-law states at a time when
both Congress and the courts found it feasible to continue to treat the
family ostensibly, at least, as so many independent persons rather than
as a unit or a group.
But income-tax inequalities have not been limited to the differences
in treatment of residents of civil-law and common-law states. They
have also existed between propertied persons in the states following
the common-law tradition and those residents who are dependent solely
upon wages and salaries for their livelihood. The former are the ones
who have been in a position to set up partnerships and trusts and to
make use of property transfers calculated to put ownership of income
in the name of the spouse in the favored surtax brackets. Persons
relying wholly upon their present labors for support have had no such
way of shifting the tax.
The household in which the wife works outside the home has also
been at a disadvantage. Personal exemptions and expense deductions
remain the same in such cases, although the working wife has additional expenses to meet. All these problems have been accentuated, of
course, by the high surtax rates of recent years and the levying of income taxes on the lower-wage groups.
' 65 Supra, note 94, at 336.
.66Supra, note 44.
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Although the estate-tax base is less broad, its rates, too, have been
high.1

7

However, from a legal standpoint it has evoked less criticism

than has the income tax. Since estate taxation is almost invariably
connected with family transfers, legislators probably visualize the
effects of the law in terms of such situations, and, as a result, although
the estate-tax sections are general in their wording and decree the same
results in all cases, still they are geared to the family situation, and,
consequently, there has been less need for reliance on the judiciary to
fit them to this particular type of case. To some extent the ideas of
dominion and control, practical ownership, and special scrutiny have
made their way into this field, but the inroads have never been so
great as they have been with regard to income taxes.
IV.

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN FAMILY TAX LAW

The need for basic changes in tax law as it affects the family has
long been apparent, and several suggestions have been made. One of
the first was that of compulsory joint returns.'" Under such a system
husband and wife, or even husband, wife and minor children, would
be required to report their total receipts as one amount; the tax being
computed at a rate applicable to the sum of their earnings. The system
has much to commend it. It is realistic in that it treats the family as
the unit which it actually is, and it offers a simple solution to the income-tax shifting problems of past years. Since there would be only
one unit of income, it would make no difference from a tax point of
view how much of it was contributed by each member of the family
group. The pressure to equalize the incomes of household members
would be relieved, and property transfers, for whatever reason entered
into, would be made without hope of gain or fear of loss from the
taxation viewpoint. Although considered at intervals, the plan has always had too many opponents to be politically feasible.8 9 Moreover, a
similar system of income taxation was attempted in Wisconsin and
Professor Magill is quoted in Osgood, "Repeal the Federal Estate Tax," 84
Trusts and Estates 246 (Feb., 1947), as having stated that "the present yields
may be considered close to the possible maximum."
168 See discussions of the plan in: Jaszi, "Treatment of Married and Single
Persons under the Individual Income Tax," 20 Taxes 259 (May, 1942) ; Ray,
"Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income
Tax," 30 Cal. L. Rev. 397 (May, 1942); Reiling, "Taxing the Income of Husband and Wife," 13 Tax Mag. 198 (April, 1935); Surrey, "Family Income
and Federal Taxation," 24 Taxes 980 (Oct., 1946); "Revenue Revision1948," Report of the Special Tax Study Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives.
189The community-property states have always objected to the plan, since it
would disregard the local law that one-half the community income belongs
to the wife.
167
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declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
1931.170
A second revision often suggested is the splitting of incomes; 171
a method whereby the total income of the family is divided equally
between the spouses. The tax is then computed at the applicable rate
on each half and the two taxes added together and reported on one
joint return. This plan has been subjected to less opposition than the
other. It gives the benefits of the community-property system to married couples in common-law states, treating husband and wife as partners for income-tax purposes. Incorporated into the 1948 Revenue Act,
it results, of course, in lowered income-tax receipts from the commonlaw states. However, this situation may ultimately be corrected by
adjustment of the rates to produce the required revenue, and at the
same time it will lead to a more equitable distribution of the tax burden.
Suggestions for change in the estate and gift-tax laws have been
concerned mostly with a better correlation of the two taxes and in
such a manner as to cause less conflict with income-tax requirements.
Foremost among such plans is that formulated by the Advisory Committee to the Treasury Department and calling for an integrated transfer tax which would take the place of the presently unrelated estate and
gift taxesY 2 An effort is made to define sharply the instant when change
of ownership takes place, at which time the single transfer tax is imposed and the former owner's income-tax liability ceases. Although
not directly concerned with the problem of family treatment, it would
have a beneficial effect as it would do away with the multiple taxes
which now often result from intra-family transfers.
V. TnE REVENUE AcT oF 1948
Out of the mistakes of the past and the suggestions for their correction has emerged the Revenue Act of 1948. Its most publicized feature is its income-splitting provision, whereby it is now possible for
spouses electing to file joint returns to divide their total income in half.
The applicable surtax rate is applied to the quotient and the resulting
tax is then multiplied by two 7 3a This method produces tax savings in
any case in which the total income falls outside the first surtax bracket.
It equalizes the treatment of married residents of community and non70

oL
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, 52 S. Ct 120. The

significance of this case is left in doubt. Although the act apparently provided that liability for the tax should rest upon each member of the family
in proportion to his contribution to the total income, the Court paid little
heed to this provision.
171 Sup ra, note 168.
172 The plan is embodied in a report entitled, "Federal Estate and Gift TaxesA Proposal for Integration and for Correlation with the Income Tax" (1947).
273 Revenue Act of 1948, Sec. 301, Slip Laws, Chap. 168, Public No. 471 (Approved, April 2, 1948).
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community property states and puts on an equal plane couples receiving investment and those receiving earned income only. Even in a
community-property state spouses may benefit by the new act, which
makes it possible for them to divide for tax purposes their separate as
well as their community income.
Although problems are bound to arise under the new method of income taxation, it does seem reasonable to suppose that to some extent,
1 4
at least, it will solve the problems in answer to which it was drafted.
It does not treat the family as a unit, as has often been suggested, but
instead places husband and wife somewhat in the position of commonlaw partners, entitled to equal shares of the income or profit from
their joint venture. The act does not, however, obliterate former tax
case-law. Since it is concerned only with the income of husband and
wife, there is still the possibility that spouses will attempt to reduce
their tax bills by making other family members, especially minor children, nominal owners of some of their income, and the old rules would
still apply to such attempted transfers. However, the incentive to shift
taxes in this manner is much lessened by the relief which has been
granted and by the equalized treatment of all married couples.
The plan makes no attempt to solve the problem of proper tax
treatment of the single person, and particularly the single person with
dependants, who must pay taxes out of proportion to those of the
married couple, since he is denied the splitting advantage because of
his marital status. An evaluation of this problem is chiefly an economic
rather than a legal matter, but it presents one of the most difficult of
1 75
tax reappraisement tasks.
Although less widely discussed, the estate and gift-tax changes
made by the new law are much more novel and far-reaching in their
effects than those of the income-tax sections. Completely new concepts are introduced, the most important being the "terminable interest"
and the "adjusted gross estate." An about-face is made with regard
to the determination of ownership of property, as local law, formerly
apt to be disregarded, has again become the criterion.
Specifically, the 1948 Act provides that spouses may dispose of as
much as one half of their property to each other without tax incidence.
174The Report of the Senate Finance Committee, No. 1013, 80th Congress, 2nd
Session, lists these problems on page 22 as the differential treatment of community and non-community property state residents; the tax advantages
open to owners of investment income as against wage-earners; the difficulties of tracing and of keeping records which will enable community-property
state residents to distinguish between community and separate income; the
use of tax-shifting devices in non-community states; and the inclination of

common-law states to adopt the community-property system to achieve tax
savings for their citizens.

175 For a discussion of problem from an economic viewpoint, see, Jaszi, supra,

note 168, and Surrey, supra, note 168.
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By section 361 of the Act, Section 812 of the Code is amended to allow
as an additional deduction in computing the net estate:
"An amount equal to the value of any interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in
determining the value of the gross estate."
This section is limited, however, by subsection (B), which provides:
"Where, upon the lapse of time, upon the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or upon the failure of an event or contingency to occur, such interest passing to the surviving spouse will
terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed with respect to
such interest"(i) If an interest in such property passes or has passed (for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth) from the decedent to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse) : and
"(ii) If by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs
or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such property after
such termination or failure of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest
(even if such deduction is not disallowed under clauses (i) and
(ii)"(iii) If such interest is to be acquired for the surviving
spouse, pursuant to directions of the decedent, by his executor
or by the trustee of a trust."
The committee has expressed its intent that (i) and (ii) be broadly
interpreted to include all types of interests passing to others for less
than a full consideration and which may be enjoyed after the termination of the interest given to the husband or wife. 1'76 For example, if
property is given to a wife and child as joint tenants, the marital deduction will not be allowed against the wife's interest, since the child
has acquired, for less than a full consideration, an interest in the
property which may extend beyond that of the wife. On the other
hand, however, if the husband were to sell realty, but to retain a twenty-year lease, and later left his ful interest in the lease to his wife, a
marital deduction could be taken. In that case the "property" would be
the lease and the wife would have received the full "interest" in it.
Subsection (F) contains an exception to (iii) and makes subject
to the marital deduction property passing from the decedent in trust
for the benefit of his wife on the condition that the income from such
property be payable to her at least annually and that she have a general
power of appointment over the corpus, exercisable either in favor of
176

Supplementary Report of the Committee on Finance, No. 1013, Part 2, 80th
Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3.
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herself or her estate.'
Although she may also have the power to
appoint to others, a power given to any other person must be limited
only to the right to appoint to her.
The marital deduction is allowed to the extent of one half the
"adjusted gross estate," defined in Section 361(a) (2) of the Act as
the entire value of the gross estate less the deductions allowed under
Section 812(b) of the Code.' 78 The value of any property held in
community may not be included in the adjusted gross estate,179 for the
reason, of course, that the surviving spouse takes his or her half interest in the community free from tax and thereby obtains the same
tax advantage flowing from the granting of the marital deduction in
other cases. The interest of the survivor, however, now has the same
cost basis as that of other property transferred at death.8 0
The purpose of the act is to achieve substantial equality between
residents of community and non-community property states' 8 by granting to the latter the privilege of transferring half of the estate to the
surviving spouse free from tax. Since, however, the transfer in a
community- property state results in a fee, the marital deduction is not
allowed in cases of transfers of separate property unless the grant is
substantially that. As a result, there will probably be more absolute
gifts and devises and fewer transfers of limited interests in the future,
since it is only through the making of the former that married couples
may take advantage of the tax savings now open to them.
Gifts to third persons will, in the future, be considered as having
been made one-half by each spouse, if the couple desires to have them
so treated. 8 2 An inter vivos gift to a spouse is also subject to a marital
deduction equal to one-half its value, unless the gift is classified as a
terminable interest. 8 3 This rule does not apply to gifts from community property.
The future of the new law is still unknown; but in the family tax
field, at least, it does seem to bring promise of more equity and certainty in its operation than did the previous enactments. Although the
importation of new terms and the reliance on local law to determine
ownership will, no doubt, give rise to a certain amount of litigation, the
law should operate more and more smoothly as various of these questions are settled. At any rate, it represents a worthwhile attempt at
the solution of tax problems in this field through basic and correlated
changes rather than by detail redesigning.
Supra, note 173, Sec. 361(a).
Generally, the deductions allowed under this section are expenditures for
funeral and administration expenses, taxes paid, and claims against the estate.
179 Supra, note 173, Sec. 361(a).
18o Ibid, Sec. 366.
8
s' Supra, note 174, at p. 27.
182 Supra, note 173, Sec. 374.
183 Ibid, Sec. 372.
'7

178

